



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World


This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Bain News Service

GENERALISSIMO FERDINAND FOCH

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

MAY, 1918

ARE WE TOO LATE?

INEFFICIENCY NOW IS TREASON

BY THE EDITOR

WE have reached, we are told, the turning point in the war. Perhaps it is so. If a turning point was desirable, and if the turn is for the better, we earnestly hope that it is so. True, we have heard of turning points before; which apparently did not materialize, or the turning of which was not decisive and effective. Perhaps we shall have better luck with this one; though we must confess that it has for some time seemed to us that what is most needed is to keep right straight on toward the goal which we long ago set.

The present turning point, however, is said to be especially in the diplomacy of the war; the President's speech at Baltimore having indicated that he has definitely abandoned all further notions of peace through negotiations or through appeals to the democracy of Germany to revolt against autocracy or yet through efforts to drive wedges between Germany and Austria, and that he is now inflexibly determined to press the war to a victorious issue through "Force, force to the utmost; force without stint or limit; the righteous, triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust." This is because he has reached a "moment of utter disillusionment" in which he realizes the iniquity of Germany's purposes and the futility of negotiating with the mad dog of the nations.

That is well. It is gratifying to know that the President has at last become disillusioned, as most thoughtful men in

America were a long time ago, and that he now fully commits himself to the course which his clear-sighted fellow citizens have from the beginning recognized to be the only one compatible with the honor of the country and with the interests of mankind, and the only one giving promise of the victory of Righteousness over the Beast. Let us sincerely hope that he will remain disillusioned, and that the "moment of utter disillusionment" will not prove fleeting and presently give place to some new illusions of "peace without victory", but will endure until the end.

This is the more to be emphasized because of the effort which is apparently being made by some of the President's superserviceable champions, through excess of zeal, to have it appear that the President himself has never suffered from illusions concerning the war, and that it is not he but the American people who have now become disillusioned. Such a pretence cannot, of course, be sanctioned by the President, who indeed in that very Baltimore speech made it quite clear that he was speaking with an exceptional degree of personality, and that it was to himself that the utter disillusionment had come. That should be clear to all. The American people have not, as some are suggesting, insisted that every offer of peace be carefully scrutinized and analyzed. They were fully convinced two years ago, by Germany's persistent lying about the U-boat outrages and other matters, that there was no truth in the Hun, and that any peace overtures should be regarded as insincere and deceitful.

Perhaps it was well that the President was more patient and more potentially credulous, and that he, unlike most thoughtful Americans, insisted upon carefully scrutinizing and analyzing every Hunnish "peace drive". It may be that in that he was wiser than the people. If so, we cheerfully credit him with that superior wisdom, and take upon ourselves and our fellow citizens the reproach of having been from the beginning skeptical and fearful of "Greeks bearing gifts"; provided always that we are not called upon to suffer the fate of Laocoon. Suffice it that President and people now alike perceive the real character of the Wooden Horse, before the thing has got within our walls. If that be the turning point which the President has reached, let us thank God and take courage. Now, at last, the road is straight before us all.

It is somewhat remarkable, however, if not disquieting, to

note that simultaneously with this pronouncement concerning the President's vision, another of his hot-gospeller champions—as though he needed a champion!—tells us that Mr. Wilson, along with Lord Roberts and a few other gifted seers, unerringly discerned the impending conflict long before it occurred; and that accordingly, weeks before that mysterious tragedy at Sarajevo which was made the pretext for the war, he sent the expert and authoritative Colonel House of Texas to Europe to endeavor to open the blinded eyes of the Governments of Great Britain, France and Germany to the awful peril which was menacing them. The extraordinary feature of the case is that the President gave no glimpse or inkling of this prescience to his own people or even to his associates in the Government. For once he regretfully laid aside his “passion for publicity,” and yielded to the impulses of what his eulogists felicitously call his “stern self-confidence” and his “close-mouthed austerity and pride.” Thus he kept the dread secret locked within his own mind and heart, while the American people, all unconscious and undreaming of it, continued in their fools' Paradise of unpreparedness and pacifism—the unpreparedness for which Mr. George Creel now devoutly gives thanks to God.

Now, assuming these representations of the President's zealous incense-burners to be entirely true, it was no doubt tremendously generous and noble of the President to bear the burden alone, and to endure the unjust imputation of knowing no more about things than any ordinary mortal. Yet questions inevitably arise. If he indeed had this “unique vision of Armageddon” with which the eulogistic historian of the New York *Evening Post* from whom we quote now credits him, was it not his duty to warn his own country, and to make at least some rudimentary preparations to meet the coming storm? And why did he so vehemently insist that we knew nothing and cared to know nothing of the sources and causes of the war? It is quite obvious that if he knew all about it in advance, if he had been able to “cast his eye abroad and note the ominous signs in world politics,” if he had “surveyed the European situation and perceived that the two opposing groups of Powers were drifting toward the war which had been dreaded for a generation,” why surely he must have known something about the causes and influences which were at work. Moreover, if his vision was at the beginning so clear and penetrating, how could it be that a little later he

became so blinded as to suffer the illusions from which he now exultantly proclaims his deliverance?

We must regret, then, that some of those who presumptuously affect to be speaking in behalf of the President do him so gross a disservice as to invest him with the fantastic figments of their own imagination. The President's speech at Baltimore contained sentiments and expressions for which no commendation could be too high. But its eloquent author had, we confidently assume, no thought of making it mark the turning point in American history, or in the history of the war. Intensely personal in tone, it made known to the nation the gratifying and inspiring fact that the President himself at last fully discerns the duplicity and insincerity of our arch-enemy, that in all further dealings with Prussian militarism his voice will be in his sword, and that he now assumes that militant leadership of the nation which the nation has long desired him to assume.

In such a conception, we must gladly acclaim this "turning point of the war." If it is thus recognized by other nations, so much the better. It should hearten our patient and long-suffering Allies to know that we are done with rainbow-chasing and with wedge-driving—save for the wedges that are driven with twelve-inch guns. That it will cause the Huns to abandon their intrigues, propaganda and falsehoods—such as Count Czernin has been profusely putting forth—we do not expect; but it will go far toward rendering such devices vain. At any rate, if it is or has been the turning point, let us stay turned, with our diplomacy as direct as the shooting of our guns.

As for the military turning point, that is a different thing. Doubtless the Huns hoped to make this Spring drive on the western front decisive. Doubtless, too, it would have been decisive, in glorious reaction against the Huns, if only the full strength of America could have been cast upon the side of our Allies. As it is, there will have to be many more "turning points" before the end is reached. One of the commonest observations concerning our own Civil War is, that Gettysburg was its "turning point." But was it, really; with all the weary campaign of the Wilderness to follow? We have always had a notion that a good case could be made out for Fort Donelson as the "turning point", in view of the fact that there was enunciated that principle of moving immediately upon the enemy's works until he was forced to "un-

conditional surrender " which in the end proved to be the only way of winning the war.

The real turning point of this war was, or is, or will be that at which America—Government and people—becomes convinced in mind and heart and soul that the only thing to do is to move immediately upon the Hun with every ounce of our fighting strength, and to keep pressing on and slaughtering Boches and destroying German resources until the Beast is beaten into unconditional surrender. Have we reached that point at last? Has the President himself reached it?

So the words spoken in conclusion at Baltimore would indicate, but the question leaps irresistibly to mind: Why was it necessary to speak them a full twelvemonth after Congress, responding promptly to the importunity of the President, made formal declaration of war? Does not the mere engaging in war imply the use of force? What else could the President himself have had in mind when he proclaimed the quick preparing of the Navy and the immediate raising of a comparatively great army, and urged the people to husband all their resources for participation in the mighty conflict? Why the present manifestations of surprise, relief and rejoicing among ourselves and notably among our Allies?

The words themselves are not dissimilar. "We are accepting this challenge", he declared in April, 1917. "I accept the challenge, I know that you accept it", he repeated in April, 1918. And, alas, the distressing record of the year cannot be disregarded.

On December 4 the President declared that peace could not even be discussed until German autocracy, "this intolerable Thing", had been defeated.

On January 8 he laid down, in fourteen carefully drawn articles, "the only possible programme" of peace; declared that we "stand together until the end" with the Allies for "these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right", and pledged America "to fight until they are achieved".

On February 11 he informed the enemy Powers that he would discuss peace upon the basis of four abstract principles he enunciated, and that "the only possible programme" of the preceding month, the "rectifications of wrong" which were then "essential", constituted merely a "set of suggestions", "only our own provisional sketch of principles".

On April 6 he recognized explicitly for the first time that

"force" was required,—“force to the utmost, force without limit or stint”,—but he declared simultaneously that he was “ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike”.

This has the old familiar judicial ring. What it really means or what it is intended to convey to our friends or to our Allies we do not venture to surmise. Undeniably at the moment “the strong” is Germany and “the weak” are Belgium, Poland and Serbia. Can it be that in the great accounting they are to “fare alike”? Does the President still consider that we have no interest in “the causes” and purposes of the mighty struggle for very existence which has been thrust upon the world by bloodthirsty Germany? Is this another “peace feeler” insinuated into a declaration of defiance more resonant even than the stern threat to hold to a strict accountability the murderers of our own unoffending citizens and children who perished with the *Lusitania*?

God forbid! Rather let us hope that, at the end of a year of pottering about in fatuous expectation of a quick collapse of the enemy when shown the ruler in the schoolmaster’s hand, the great drive has finally opened the President’s eyes to the stark, staring menace not merely to France and to England but to our own beloved country. And upon pended knees, in humility and shame, let us all, *and let him*, beseech Almighty God to permit us *and him* to atone in the immediate future for the sins of the past. Never, never, since America won her independence and peace *with* victory has she been so humiliated as she is today. Warning after warning has passed unheeded, pleading after pleading has been made in vain, prediction after prediction of the terrific struggle now in progress has been placidly assumed by our own pathetically disorganized War Department,—with what result? *One hundred thousand* American soldiers on the fighting line when there should have been and could have been *half a million*, and that small number broken up into segments and scattered from Nieuport to Belfort, as mere fillers-in, inadequate as a separate command to maintain a single sector or part of a sector against the Huns. Little Portugal has us beaten numerically two to one. “Exhausted England” sent twice as many thoroughly trained troops to Picardy in ten days after the mighty battle began as we have furnished in a year.

Patient and propitiatory as our Allies have been, considerate and flattering as their Press has been compelled to be to ourselves generally and to our President specifically, the pent-up feelings of England and France finally found an outlet which could no longer be restrained through the outspoken declaration of the British Premier to the House of Commons.

In America there is a very considerable number of men in the course of training and the allies look forward to having a large American army in France in the spring. It has taken longer than anticipated to turn those soldiers into the necessary divisional organizations. If America waited to complete these divisional organizations it would not be possible for these fine troops in any large numbers to take part in this battle in this campaign, although it might be very well the decisive battle of the war.

This was, of course, one of the most serious disappointments from which the allies had suffered. It is no use pretending it was not one of our chief causes of anxiety. We depend upon it largely to make up the defection of Russia. For many reasons—reasons, perhaps, of transport, reasons connected with the time it takes, not merely to train troops and their officers, but to complete the necessary organization—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of divisions every one had confidently expected would be there.

Under the circumstances we, therefore, submitted to the President of the United States a definite proposal. We had the advantage of having the Secretary of War in this country within two or three days after the battle had commenced. Mr. Balfour and I had a long conversation with him upon the whole situation, and we submitted to him certain recommendations which we had been advised to make to Mr. Baker and the American government.

On the strength of the conversation we submitted proposals to President Wilson with the strong support of Premier Clemenceau, to enable the combatant strength of the American Army to come into action during this battle, inasmuch as there was no hope of it coming in as a strong separate army. By this decision American battalions will be brigaded with those of the allies. This proposal was submitted by Earl Reading on behalf of the British government to President Wilson, and President Wilson assented to the proposal without any hesitation, with the result that arrangements now are being made for the fighting strength of the American Army to be brought immediately to bear in this struggle, a struggle which is only now beginning, to this extent, and it is no mere small extent, that the German attack has been held up. It has stirred up the resolution and energy of America beyond anything which has yet occurred.

Courteously excusing us for policy's sake while looking to the future, Mr. Lloyd George plainly put the blame for the "serious disappointment" which our Allies suffered squarely upon the American Government, where it belongs. To miti-

gate the offense which might be resented by our sensitive Administration he called attention to "the material and dramatic assistance rendered by President Wilson in this emergency",—in response, in fact, to a virtual demand from both France and England that our little force be split up to fill the chinks, here, there and everywhere, thus rendering useless all of our railway building and other arrangements to feed, clothe and care for our own men and taking out of their hearts the spirit of comradeship and National pride which makes for success in battle.

"If we wish to avoid a war lasting for years", said Lloyd George,—and by this he meant to avert defeat and destruction—"this battle must be won now, and to win it we must be ready to throw in all our resources. The men we propose taking today may well be the means of winning the decisive victory of the war and with these measures and with the promise of America we have no fear of the ultimate issue".

The *promise* of America! That is all they have had except money, of little real value in such a crisis, and food—and now they have transferred to us their food ships, deliberately facing starvation, to bear our troops to the rescue because, after a full year, we have no means of transporting them ourselves. And eleven months and two weeks after we declared war and everybody knew the one vital need was ships, ships, ships, we are expected to be thrilled by the announcement in newspaper headlines that "President Wilson personally directs that the movement of troops abroad be hastened", to be protected, after they get there, we assume, by the one solitary combat airplane which so far we have started on its way.

But despair we must not. While our own Government is rubbing its eyes in irritated resentment at having to cease dreaming dreams, our Allies are more nobly resolute than ever.

"If", writes a trustworthy American from London, "Italy should give up, if France should crack, if even the United States should desert her, England would only withdraw her army to her own shores, dispose her navy to meet the new situation, develop her own production and, if need be, fight on for forty years. This is the English spirit and the daily mood of the English people".

And the old tiger Clemenceau adds:

Bleating about peace will not crush Prussian militarism. War and

nothing but war must be the only thought. In all wars he is the conqueror who can believe a quarter of an hour longer than his adversary that he is not beaten. I shall continue the war to the last quarter of an hour, for the last quarter of an hour will be ours.

But withal they know that only America can save the day. That they will hold fast to the last ditch and the last man we cannot doubt. But if, despite all resistance, the Huns should succeed in dividing the armies, what then for stricken France but surrender, what for England but a last great stand, and what for America, which has stopped work absolutely upon both her coast defenses and her battleships, but reverberations from the canyons of despair—

Too late; too late; too late!

Take heed, you men in authority:

Inefficiency now is treason.

A CALL TO PATRIOTS

REPRINTED FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW'S
WAR WEEKLY

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918.

THE Hun is at the gate; the Republic is in peril; freedom is at stake; civilization and humanity tremble in the balance; America must save the cause; her sons are on the battle-line; her men and boys, her women and daughters at home are working, giving, hoping and praying for victory, in this, the darkest hour of the great invasion.

Shall we at such a time impair the power and strength of the Nation through partisan strife among ourselves when every ounce of the energies which we can rally is required to meet the beseeching calls of our bleeding Allies, to help, help, help, in their desperate and heartrending struggle against the common foe?

"United we stand, divided we fall!"

No country has better reason than our own to realize this immutable truth; none has heeded it in the past at greater cost in the blood of men and the grief of women. Can nothing be done to avert the calamitous effects of a bitter political contest throughout the Union, already beginning and bound to rage with increasing virulence till the polls shall close in November?

Forget patriotism (God forgive us!) for a moment and heed only partisan considerations.

What has the Democratic party to gain from a contested election next Fall? It already has a majority in the House,—small but sufficient; suppose that majority should be increased to fifty or a hundred, what of it? Mr. Clark would continue to be Speaker, there would be no changes in chairmanships of committees and the new members would be as ciphers except in voting. True, such a result might be heralded as a striking testimonial of approval of the Administration, but that is all. There would be no practical advantage. And if the opposition should win, what then? Surely, in the words of the late Mr. Holman, it is better to be safe than sorry. Weighing possibilities in the balance, clearly the Democrats have nothing tangible to win and much perhaps to lose from the hazard of an election.

What of the Republicans? Suppose they should carry the House, what would they have won? Committee chairmanships, clerks and doorkeepers and—a Speaker, presumably Mr. Mann, who voted for the McLemore resolution and for pretty much everything else that the Germans wanted. They would acquire no real power,—not even control of the great appropriations which have already been made chiefly and would be completed between November and March. In point of fact, they would not be in a position to oppose any measure proposed by the President because they would have been elected under pledges to uphold vigorous prosecution of the war. For this very reason, moreover, they could not even maintain successfully that their majority should be taken as a rebuke to the Administration, unless the choice of a virtual pro-German as Speaker should be so regarded,—and surely that would be neither palatable nor popular. All they could claim would be that they had been elected simply and solely because they were Republicans.

The only thing under the sun that the Republicans could win by carrying the House would be the privilege of dividing the responsibility for the future conduct of the war,—thus barring them completely from making a clean-cut issue two years later, when the existing Government as a whole must make an accounting to the people and either stand or fall upon the record made with full authority.

No less surely than the Democrats, though for quite different reasons, the Republicans have nothing to win and much, perhaps, to lose from a contested election.

But the country and the cause have a great deal, a very

great deal, perhaps everything, to gain from an agreement between the two parties to re-elect practically all of the present members. Let us enumerate a few of the advantages:

1. It would avert the bitterness of a nation-wide campaign.

2. It would make the issue, wherever an issue might be raised, one of Loyalty pure and simple, with no such differentiations as disgraced the Wisconsin campaign and might easily have produced a Socialist, pro-German Senator.

3. It would not only achieve specifically but would signify notably to our Allies a splendid unity in purpose and determination.

4. It would eliminate the dangerous participation in a political contest of two millions of soldiers in camps scattered from Flanders to California.

5. It would obviate the waste of hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of dollars in useless electioneering when every penny is needed to win the war.

6. It would save at least a day's time consumed by anywhere from ten to fifteen millions of men in simply voting, to say nothing of many days of campaigning, thus increasing the country's productivity by this means alone by more than a hundred millions of dollars.

7. It would release for speaking for Liberty loans and other war purposes, not only the hundreds of the chosen representatives of the people, but also thousands of others who otherwise would be electioneering, — not only release them, but release them in such a way that Republican and Democrat could stand shoulder to shoulder upon the same platform and plead the cause of their common country.

8. It would elevate Patriotism above Politics and would redound to the pride and glory of the Nation whose elders at home would bury prejudice in their eagerness to back up the boys abroad who soon will be giving up their lives by the thousand in the service of the Republic.

Can it be done? Of course, it can be done. *It is being done.* Already the leaven is working. And it makes the heart glad that again the Old Dominion leads the way. Two years ago the Ninth District of Virginia elected Bascomb Slemple, a Republican, to Congress, by a plurality of only 1,388 out of a total vote of 34,308,—a margin none too large for comfort. But there will be no contest this year. Last

week the Democratic district committee met and adopted unanimously the following resolution:

Whereas the minds and hearts of all our people are and should be turned toward the winning of the war for democracy, and whereas we do not believe their time and energy should be diverted from patriotic activities into the requirements of a fierce partisan campaign, therefore we recommend to the democratic party in the ninth Virginia congressional district that no nomination for Congress be made this year.

Fitting and stirring expression of patriotic thought! And what was done in the Ninth District of Virginia can be done in practically every other district in the country by co-operative action to that end by the official leaders of the two great parties.

What have they to say? Is it too much to ask that Chairman McCormick and Chairman Hays call their executive committees together and at least consider the practicability of reaching an understanding which would save God only knows how many precious lives—and, it might be, even the war itself?

Upon the Presidential election in 1920, as we have said, the suggestion has no bearing whatever. The future must care for itself.

With respect to Senators to be elected next Fall, the impropriety of attempting to choose by agreement men to serve six years is apparent. Nevertheless, the fact may well be noted that a fine spirit is beginning to pervade the country. Already the Democrats have given notice that they will not oppose the re-election of Senators Nelson of Minnesota and Kenyon of Iowa, and it is virtually assured that the two parties in Idaho will unite upon Senators Borah and Nugent, if the former, as it is hoped and believed, shall reconsider his determination to withdraw from public service at this critical time.

Other States which may be ignored because of the conclusiveness of party primaries are Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, Colorado, Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Michigan, South Carolina, Mississippi and Wyoming, leaving only fifteen States in which Senatorial elections would be requisite in November, to wit: Rhode Island, New Mexico, Maine, West Virginia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Kentucky, Illinois, Oregon, Nebraska, Delaware, Kansas, South Dakota, Montana and Massachusetts.

Doubtless, too, several of these States will follow the example of Iowa and Minnesota, and reach agreements shortly, thereby reducing the total to so small a number that the two National Committees could readily effect an arrangement such as we have proposed, to little or no injury to either party or any individual and to incalculable advantage of the country and the cause.

Our call is to the patriotism of America.

Consider what a partisan election means!

Next November the people of the several States, as duly ordained by the Constitution, will march to the polls and drop a ballot in the box bearing the name of John Doe, Republican, or Richard Roe, Democrat. Mr. John Doe is the present member from the Sixty-ninth District of Michigan. We do not know him, that is those of us who live in New York or Massachusetts or Pennsylvania, but we do know that Mr. John Doe is a loyalist, that he is in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war against Germany, that being a decent, straightforward, upstanding American he has supported the President since the declaration of war against Germany, that he has voted for all the war legislation the President has recommended, that he has urged his constituents to buy Liberty bonds, to support the Red Cross, to economise in the use of food; in short, to do everything that an American should do in these critical days, and that is to devise means whereby the largest number of Germans can be killed in the shortest space of time at the smallest cost to American life.

So far as the war is concerned—and that is the one thing now that concerns every man, woman and child in the United States—Mr. John Doe is neither a Republican nor a Democrat. He is neither a Prohibitionist nor a friend of the demon rum. He is neither a Suffragist nor an Anti. He is simply a good American who has risen superior to petty politics and has put all his heart and strength and vigor of intellect into the great cause. And there are 434 other John Does and Richard Roes—barring the few disloyalists of whom we shall speak presently—like him; like him, patriots and not partisans, like him, heart and soul in the war and thinking of only one thing—how to win in the shortest possible time.

Beginning with this month and until late in the summer the 435 members of the House will—if there is to be a partisan election—be thinking of their renominations. Every member wants to be renominated, naturally and properly enough. Having worked for the best interests of the country he thinks he is entitled to a renomination. In every district there is at least one man, in some a dozen or more in both parties, who cherish the ambition to come to Congress. Mr. John Doe has made enemies in his own party, and the opposing party might capture the seat. Mr. John Doe,

therefore, from now until his nomination must give every thought to his own political future. He must fix his political fences, and that cannot be done at long range. Instead of being in Washington attending to legislative business Mr. John Doe is at home wooing his constituents. Mr. John Doe has ceased to be a disinterested patriot, to whom the war and nothing but the war counts, and has become a politician.

The thing is psychological. In the atmosphere of the House, where party has ceased to exist, he is influenced by his moral surroundings and sees the infamy of injecting politics into the conduct of the war, but at home, where he has gone solely to talk politics, where he appeals for support solely on political grounds, he sinks again to the level of the party man. If he is a Republican, he solicits the influence of Republicans because the Democrats have managed the war very badly; and while he may not honestly believe that it is the only justification for his retention, he strives to establish his case. And if he is a Democrat, the argument is reversed.

Now follow the thing through. Mr. John Doe goes back to Washington and in the House, even while voting for a war measure, he criticises the Administration to show to his constituents what a good party man he is. Instead of having one thought he has two, and the second has subordinated the first. What he thinks of more now than anything else is his renomination. The opposition is active and it behooves him to be vigilant. His courage is tempered by caution, he dodges a vote for fear of offending and is sensitive to criticism. In a word, his former robust independence is weakened by the fear of losing his nomination.

Having gained his nomination, he will for the next four or five months make his claim for reelection purely on the score of party politics. In substance what he will say is this: "Of course I shall support the President in the conduct of the war, but it is much better for the country to have a Republican majority in the House of Representatives than a Democratic majority. Give us a Republican majority and the war will be managed more efficiently. You ask for proof. Look at the mistakes made by the War Department, remember the past winter and the shortage of coal, do not forget the time when sugar was short." And a great many people will heed him.

His Democratic opponent will controvert this. Now we are not in the least interested in John Does and Richard

Roes personally. We think it is not of the slightest consequence to the country at large or the carrying on of the war whether the Sixty-ninth District of Michigan is represented in Washington by John Doe, Democrat, or Richard Roe, Republican, provided both men are loyal Americans; what we are vitally interested in is the effect it will have on the country.

The war cannot be successfully prosecuted unless the country puts its whole heart into it, unless it is unified, unless its strength, both physical and spiritual, is given to the sole purpose of war. It is idle to pretend, it is either the dishonesty of knavery or the ignorance of fools, that the country can be unified when for the next six or eight months it will be talking and thinking politics and the appeal will be made to passion and narrow prejudice in favor of Richard Roe and what he represents, to the injury of John Doe and what he stands for. Resort to all the hypocrisy you please, talk as grandly as you like about "the free choice of the people", neither hypocrisy nor humbug can conceal the facts.

What are the facts? Simply personal selfishness and the contemptible meanness of professional politicians and a certain number of men who would sacrifice the common good for their own advantage or that of their party. The managers of the Republican party hope to carry the House, believing it will forecast their victory in the Presidential election. We shall not venture a prediction as to what will happen next November, but if we know anything of American politics we are prepared without reservation to affirm that were the election to be held next week the Democrats would control the House by a substantial majority. The Democrats want an election because they believe it will strengthen their majority and it will foreshadow their continuance in power two years later. In some districts the sitting member is to be jockeyed out of the nomination, in other districts the majority is to be reversed by appeals to partisanship. In every case the motive is the same. Selfishness, personal gain—\$7,500 a year, mileage and Congressional perquisites—and the vanity attaching to being an "honorable" are to submerge the cause to which we are dedicated.

Throw this country into the turmoil of an election this year and what will happen? We shall see the war relegated to the inside pages of the newspapers and the front pages

given over to the speeches of the Richard Roes and John Does, "the monster rally" at the Grand Opera House and the torch light procession. Instead of the people discussing the war, soberly thinking about the war, we shall hear them excitedly discussing the tariff, prohibition, votes for women. Instead of the people going to hear Liberty Loan speeches, they will go to hear political addresses. Instead of the thought of the people being concentrated on one thing, and that thing the only thing that matters, they will be distracted by the claims of rival party hacks, of the virtues of one party or the vices of another. Politics will creep into the camp, into the factory, into the home. Solidarity will be weakened.

What is to be gained by it? A few more Republicans or a few less Democrats. A speaker who is a Democrat or a Republican. Republican chairmen of committees where there are now Democrats. Will it save the life of a single American boy? Will it shorten the war by a single hour? Will it stop the expenditure of one dollar? We gain nothing by it, but we throw the country into discord and confusion, arouse antagonism, leave resentment, and break down that unity without which the war cannot be won.

The solution is simple, as we have shown. The Constitutional requirement of an election every two years would be observed, but there would be no necessity for any member of Congress to leave Washington to look after his fences or campaign, there would be no political speeches and no injection of politics into the more serious business of carrying on the war. Those members of the present House who are disloyal, fortunately they are few, should be notified by their party chiefs that unless they decline to be candidates for re-election they will be opposed by a non-partisan candidate. In nearly every case the threat would be sufficient, and the obstinate man would be slaughtered at the polls without it having been necessary to make a campaign, as the mere publication of a man's name on the blacklist of disloyalty would mean his defeat.

It would protect the President. Mr. Wilson cannot be entirely deaf to the claims of party. He is now pestered to make certain appointments for party reasons. Politics should not be permitted to pass the portals of the White House, and yet politics will penetrate the White House as they will the camp, the factory and the home if there is an election this year. The politicians fear the public will disap-

prove. Their fears are misplaced. The public takes the broad view; it would welcome any arrangement whereby politics can be kept out of the war. Both in England and in France there has been no general election since the beginning of the war. From England and France we have learned much about the conduct of war; may we not learn from them the further lesson that if a country would make war successfully abroad, it cannot carry on political warfare at home?

AMERICANS SHOULD BE AMERICANS

THE Secretary of the Interior is right. There is need of Americanization. There is need of it in elements and fundamentals. The latest census discloses the discreditable fact that nearly five per cent of the adult population of the United States can neither read nor write the English—which is the American—language; more than 4.6 per cent of those over twenty years of age, and more than 5.5 per cent of those over ten years. Incidentally, Mr. Lane reminds us that of registered men of conscription age nearly 700,000 are illiterate; wherefore our “citizenry trained to arms”, upon whom we have been bidden to rely for protection, are largely a citizenry untrained to letters.

Now that is discreditable, and something more. It is a menacing condition. A state cannot be in a healthful condition when more than a quarter of its adult citizens are unable to read or write the national language. For these illiterates are practically debarred from the information which is essential to good citizenship. Consider: The President is occasionally making addresses to Congress of the highest importance. The Government is issuing innumerable tracts and bulletins, filled with information about the war, about food conservation, about agriculture, about a multitude of things of direct and very great interest to all the people for their own good and for the nation's good. In addition, there are all the publications of newspapers and books, conveying information which every citizen should have in order to understand the issues of the day and his duty concerning them.

But all these are practically sealed books to the illiterate. He can know of them only through hearsay. His neighbor, who can read, is his only source of information. But that neighbor may not accurately understand what he has read.

If he does understand it, he may not have the faculty—which indeed is rare among the best of us—of accurately repeating it. And if he does repeat accurately, it is practically certain that he does not repeat fully, but merely a few of the more sensational and striking portions, which may not give anything like a correct notion of the whole. The result is that the illiterate person gets at best only a partial and distorted view of affairs, while there is always grave danger that he will get a maliciously perverted view. For the propagandist of evil is always more fluent and zealous in imparting misinformation than any good citizen is likely to be in telling the truth.

Similar considerations apply, in some respects with even more force, to the other millions who, while more or less illiterate in English, are literate in some alien language, the language of the country from which they or their parents came hither. They are similarly debarred from information in English, and are dependent upon that which is provided in the alien press, and this latter is almost inevitably colored with alien hues. For example: In the first two years of the war, before America entered it, multitudes of Germans, Austrians and Hungarians in this country gained their chief if not their only knowledge of it from the papers printed in their own mother tongues. We know quite well what that too often meant. There was presented to them not the American view but the alien view.

“As a man thinketh, so is he.” And as a man reads or hears, so he thinks. Getting their information from alien sources, they cherished alien thoughts, and thus themselves remained or became essentially alien. There can be no doubt that to this cause is due much of the pro-German and disloyal sentiment which has persisted throughout the United States during our first year of the war. Those who cherish it may or may not have become legally and technically naturalized: They certainly have not been Americanized in mind and heart and thought and feeling. Obviously the first step toward such Americanization is to get into touch with America by learning to use the English language as the common medium of speech, reading and thought. That is why illiteracy in English is so serious a matter.

For this same reason we must approve the action which is being widely taken for the very great modification if not the entire suppression of German studies in the public schools.

It would be foolish to exclude German from the curriculum simply because we are at war with Germany. But in so far as German is retained, it should be regarded, treated and taught as a foreign language, at par with other foreign languages. Such, it is notorious, has not always been the case. In many schools, with large German constituencies, German has been exploited far beyond due bounds, as though it and not English were the national language. That has been because German parents have wanted their children to be educated in German rather than English, and to regard German and not English as their mother tongue. To that end, there have been used German text books, some of them revised if not originally prepared in Germany for the purpose, in which German immigrants in America, and their American-born children as well, are urged, even commanded, under penalty of disgrace, to cherish the German tongue as their own, above that of their adopted land. It was monstrous that such teaching was ever permitted in American schools. It would be moral treason to tolerate it longer.

That the pernicious system of dual allegiance, which Germany alone has had the effrontery to maintain, should be specifically and completely condemned, goes without saying. We should think that it would be quite proper to refuse naturalization to any persons coming from a country which maintained it, unless they would under oath expressly repudiate and abjure it. So, too, there should be an end of the system, prevailing in some States of this Union, of permitting unnaturalized or only partly naturalized men to vote. Since the Constitution forbids the States to abridge or deny the right of suffrage on certain grounds, it seems a pity that it does not also forbid the granting of suffrage to any who have not complied with certain requirements.

We have further been reminded in this war of the impolicy of permitting great masses of aliens to come hither and to remain here unnaturalized. There was proposed a few years ago a scheme for requiring immigration to be proportioned to naturalization, so as to permit immigration of those who became American citizens, and to prohibit that of those who did not become naturalized. It is to be believed that some plan of that nature would be beneficent. Certainly it would be desirable in some way to discourage and indeed to prevent the accumulation in America of numerous alien colonies persistently remaining alien in allegiance and in

speech. It is well to be hospitable. But it would be poor policy to carry our hospitality so far as to make America no longer worth coming to.

“WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?”

THE ancient lawyer's question comes aptly to mind in scanning the international relationships of the great war. Who is our neighbor? Or, *mutatis mutandis*, who are our allies? Who are our foes? More specifically, where does Russia stand? And Japan? Also, Bulgaria? And that once Unspeakable Turk whose unspeakableness is now surpassed by that of his Kultured ally and overlord?

There may be some uncertainty concerning Russia. At first she was undoubtedly our ally, and was treated as such, and acted as such; until the rise of Lehmann and Braunstein, *alias* Lenine and Trotzky, who have repudiated that alliance. Are we to insist that the former relationship still exists, or are we to accept the dictum of the Bolsheviki? Upon the answer depends the technical justification of the course which we should pursue in respect of Siberia, though it may not affect the character of the course.

First, then, if Russia is still our ally; what? Why, we should intervene, or should sanction our allies' intervening, in Siberia, to restore and to maintain order and to prevent such Hunnish deviltry there as there has been at the other side of the empire. If Russia is our ally, she should trust us and our other allies, and should welcome our coöperation; just as France welcomes it in Picardy and Champagne.

But if she is no longer our ally? In that case we are under no obligation to help her, but neither are we under obligation to stand idly by and let her surrender her territory to our foes, to our peril. If she cannot or will not keep her house in order and prevent our enemies from utilizing it against us, our natural rights of self-protection, or those of our ally, Japan, abundantly warrant intervention to abate the nuisance—just as we intervened in Florida, a century ago.

In either case, therefore, we should approve and encourage Japanese intervention just so far as may be necessary to keep order in Siberia and to keep the Hun out.

But is Japan our ally? Well, she is certainly the ally of our allies, France and Great Britain, and it would there-

fore be rather awkward if she were not ours also. We have been treating her in various respects as though she were our ally. We have just been borrowing a lot of her shipping, for belligerent purposes, which we should scarcely have done if there were not close relations between us; and not long ago we made a "gentlemen's agreement" with her which we should not have made with a power which we did not trust. The assumption is, therefore, that Japan is our ally, and that she should be treated as such.

Similar considerations apply to the relationship between Japan and Russia. Earlier in the war they certainly regarded each other as allies. Indeed, Russia inclined so much toward Japan as almost to excite jealousy on the part of other powers. There is a story, so well substantiated that it would take a good deal to disprove it, that before the war, and in the early part of the war, Russia employed many Japanese in her navy, to raise it to the efficiency which Japan's fleet had displayed under Admiral Togo; and that in consequence, when a Russian vessel was selected by the allies for the honor of leading the way through the Dardanelles, the batteries of that Russian ship were manned by Japanese gunners. We should say that after that Russia ought not to demur at Japanese intervention to save Siberia from chaos or the Huns.

The logical solution of the Siberian problem would have been, at the first menace of either Hunnish conquest or domestic chaos, for the allied Powers to send in thither a joint expedition for protective purposes. This would have consisted chiefly, of course, of Japanese, but also of small contingents from America and the other allies, as a guarantee of good faith and of the responsibility of all the Allies for the benevolent conduct of the expedition. To say that just because the men who have surrendered all western Russia to the Huns and have involved all European Russia in disorder and collapse, object to any interference with similar processes in Siberia, we must stand aside and see such ruin wrought, would be to repudiate much of the spirit in which this war is being waged and some of the purposes which we have in view in waging it.

We have raised, also, the question of our relationship to Bulgaria and Turkey. With those Powers we are nominally at peace, and their subjects in this country do not come under the ban of enemy aliens. Yet those Powers are certainly

active allies of our foe, and are the foes of our Allies. They are assisting our enemies against us. They are "adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort." For Americans to do that would be treason. For aliens to do it can scarcely be reckoned friendship. If, as we are told, troops from those countries are operating on the western front, where our own troops are, will they refrain from firing upon our men and attack only our Allies? And are our men to be careful not to fire upon them, but only upon their allies?

It seems to us an anomalous state of affairs, for us to be assisting our allies on the western front, but to be unwilling or unable to aid them in the east. It is a noble thing for us to strive to right the wrongs of Belgium; but why should we debar ourselves from striking a single blow in behalf of the other martyr nations, Serbia and Armenia?

Surely by this time we ought to be able to tell which nations are our allies and which are our foes; and to be ready to treat them according to that classification.

FOCH

"Unless all history is at fault, the appointment of a Generalissimo is essential to success."—NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for December.

"In warfare men are nothing; a man is everything. It was not the Roman army that conquered Gaul; but Caesar. It was not the Carthaginians that made armies of the Republic tremble at the very gates of Rome, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army marched to the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the French army that carried war to the Weser and the Inn, but Turenne; it was not the Prussian army that defended Prussia during seven years against the then greatest Powers of Europe, but Frederick the Great."

Napoleon's maxim comes back to us with alienated majesty, as the Allies worn with almost four years of sacrifices, turn to the French military master for guidance and accept his greatest living exponent for their leader.

For the present it would avail nothing to recount in detail the horrible sacrifices that civilization has made since August, 1914, because the Allies have been without leadership. Future historians may be relied upon to lift the veil and tell the whole truth to another generation. Let us recall the errors of the past only as warnings for the future.

Having resolved to begin anew and follow Napoleonic precepts it was indeed fitting that Ferdinand Foch should be chosen to lead the allied armies. Those who have studied Foch's *Conduct of War* and Napoleon's *Divines* and who have compared the generalissimo's tactics in the field with those of the First Consul, must, indeed, be impressed by the degree to which the student has imbibed the principles and methods of his master.

In the writings and tactics of Foch we are constantly impressed with the kind of direct, simple, powerful decisions and executions that made Napoleon master of the continent. We find little or no time wasted on theoretical discussions of the finer points of strategy. Throughout his works we find him constantly urging "activity, activity, activity and common sense."

There is but one sharp difference between Napoleon and Foch. It is in years. Foch is now more than twice as old as Napoleon was when he reached his zenith. He was born in a little town near the Spanish border sixty-six and a half years ago. He is short, closely knit, extremely well preserved for his years and looks like a warrior. Like Napoleon he is an artilleryman by training and a horseman by preference. His earlier career was not unlike that of the ordinary French officer—except that he excelled in diligence. He did the routine of a junior officer to the French artillery school where he eventually established himself as one of the republic's great military authorities.

It was on March 5, 1914, that General Foch found his first real opportunity to put into practice his life time studies. Next to Joffre it was Foch who contributed most to the defeat of the German onrush. Without Foch's superb execution Joffre would not have prevailed. The French line had been forced back to the valley of the Marne and von Kluck threatened to envelop the left wing and take Paris. Joffre issued his famous order:

"The moment has come for the army to advance at all costs and allow itself to be slain where it stands, rather than give way."

As the French left wing moved forward in obedience to the order, von Kluck found that his plans would not carry and immediately made a redistribution of his forces with the intention of driving a wedge through the center. Foch holding the center, commanded the Ninth Army of 120,000

men. Von Kluck attacked him with the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Army of 200,000. As the wings recoiled under the terrific French attacks, Foch's troops were forced to bear the brunt of the entire German movement. For five days the Germans battered him with ever increasing force, finally on the ninth of September, the crisis came, the French line was breaking and Foch performed his supreme exploit. He sent this telegram to Joffre:

"My right has been driven in, my left has been driven in—therefore with all that I have left in my centre I will attack."

Materially and physically at that hour Foch was beaten but his indomitable will mastered the Germans. From that day the slow German retreat began. Is it any wonder that Joffre called him "The first strategist of Europe?"

Six weeks after the Marne, when the Germans attempted to outflank the entire French army, to seize the Channel ports and destroy England's lines of communications, General Foch, then in command of the allied forces, saved the British on the banks of the Yser and stopped the Germans at Ypres.

Foch is the sole allied commander, now in active service, who has never failed to carry through a major operation that he planned and directed. He is the sole active commander who has the unbounded respect and admiration of the British and French forces.

Indeed from every viewpoint, he appears to be the sole commander fitted by training, experience and successes to outwit Hindenburg.

It is not too much to hope that some future commentator on Napoleon may amend his maxim with this:—

"It was not the allied armies, who struggled hopelessly for four years, that finally drove the Germans across the Rhine; but Ferdinand Foch."